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THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST 
SEGREGATED EDUCATION 
Robert L. Carter* 
THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCA-
TION, 1925-1950. By Mark Tushnet. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 222. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $9.95. 
It may be doing Professor Tushnet a disservice for me to review his 
book since I was one of the lawyers involved in the planning and exe-
cution of the "strategy" he seeks to explore. Yet, I suppose that one in 
my position should be able to appraise more closely the accuracy, if 
not the merits, of such an examination. 1 
Much of the historical ground covered by Professor Tushnet's 
study has been plowed rather thoroughly. Richard Kluger's Simple 
Justice 2 and Robert Rabin's Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives 
on Public Interest Law 3 are prime examples. Since Kluger's study nar-
rated many of the events that Tushnet covers, and Rabin used the 
NAACP staff as a model for public interest law activity, any author 
would be somewhat pressed to add much of anything new. 
Professor Tushnet seems, in particular, to be constantly looking 
over his shoulder at Kluger's Simple Justice in an attempt to stake out 
a territory of his own. He states: 
[M]y narrative has a narrower scope than [Kluger's Simple Justice] in 
regard to both the period of time covered and the subject matter dis-
cussed. It is informed by a concern for the constraints placed on the 
litigation strategy by organizational needs, and for the significance of the 
NAACP campaign as it applies to the theory and practice of public in-
terest law in general. It is, therefore, an interpretation as well as a narra-
tive of events. [p. xi] 
While I appreciate the extent to which one's present personal rec-
ollection of events long past is suspect, I am convinced that in this 
instance the written record does not provide a full picture of the events 
* Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
1. I am somewhat troubled by one thing which I did not recall and do not now recall even 
after learning from a reference in the book that it occurred. P. 191, n.12. Professor Tushnet 
interviewed me in 1980 in the course of preparing this treatise. I have no recollection of it or 
him, and as far as I can tell, he uses the interview only to support the written record of my firm 
commitment to a direct attack on school segregation. It seems evident, therefore, that the inter-
view did not influence the writing of the book or its review. 
2. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSflCE (1975). 
3. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 
207 (1970). 
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and decisions forming the legal strategy about which Tushnet writes.4 
Tushnet sometimes reaches conclusions that are at odds with what I 
believe took place. This is most notably true in his reliance, for exam-
ple, on letters exchanged among Thurgood Marshall, William Hastie 
and others, in apparent support of Tushnet's conclusion5 as to how 
and why "strategy" was affected or modified. Unfortunately, there is 
no record of oral staff discussions, debates, or determinations. While 
Marshall solicited advice and comments from a great many people, I 
know of no decision on legal strategy in the school cases, or indeed in 
any other area, that he made during my tenure (and I was on the staff 
from the mid-forties through the period covered here) that was at odds 
with the staff's view. Even when his chief outside advisors (Hastie, 
Robert Ming, and William Coleman) favored a course opposed by his 
staff, Marshall allowed his staff's view to prevail. 
Professor Tushnet's narrative traces the NAACP's program to 
outlaw segregation in education from its origin pursuant to a 1930 
grant from the American Fund for Public Service, founded by Charles 
Garland ("The Garland Fund"), to the institution of the school-segre-
gation litigation in Kansas and South Carolina in 1950. The Garland 
Fund pledged $100,000 to 'the NAACP. Only about $20,000 of that 
grant was actually disbursed. Nonetheless, upon obtaining the money 
in 1930, the NAACP was able to hire Nathan Margold, a prominent 
New York lawyer, for a three-month period. Margold's contribution 
was the submission of a proposed plan of attack on "segregation irre-
mediably coupled with discrimination" in the public schools (p. 27). 
Margold, did not remain involved long enough, however, to do any-
thing other than devise the proposal. The NAACP lacked funds to 
pay him beyond the three-month period. 
Thereafter, Charles Houston became the NAACP's chief counsel. 
Houston put Margold's plan into operation, but not at the public 
school level. Rather, Houston's strategy was to have qualified blacks 
4. For his historical data, Professor Tushnet seems to rely almost wholly on the written 
record - documents (correspondence, memoranda) in the files of the NAACP and Legal De-
fense Fund now in the Library of Congress. When the manuscript was being written, Tushnet 
notes, many of the documents of the Legal Defense Fund were inaccessible. They had not been 
sorted and were stored in boxes piled from floor to ceiling without any labelling. I do not know 
whether a review of these documents would have added anything to his narrative or conclusions. 
The documents he was able to study were those available to Kluger, and additional material 
donated to the Library of Congress subsequent to Kluger's study. 
5. Pp. 105-37. Tushnet gives the impression that the sudden constraints of trial preparation 
in the Sweatt case, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) affected the NAACP's strategy. Pp. 
126-29. I do not believe that observation is correct. The all-out-attack position had been articu-
lated in the Mendez case, Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1947). 
The national staff had been at work in researching historical materials, legal and otherwise, sup-
porting the invalidity of enforced segregation. Moreover, the sociological approach had been 
decided upon and we were waiting for a case that would enable us to make a record of our 
sociological thesis. The Sweatt trial provided that opportunity. Thus, all we needed when Sweatt 
was being readied for trial was to secure the necessary expert witnesses. 
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apply for graduate and professional training in the states where blacks 
were barred from existing state graduate and professional institutions 
and in which no "separate but equal" facility for blacks had been es-
tablished. 6 Houston's aim was to undermine segregation by forcing 
states that practiced segregation to establish graduate and professional 
schools for blacks, with the expectation that the economic costs would 
be such that state authorities would themselves decide to desegregate 
the existing facilities. Thurgood Marshall followed Houston as the or-
ganization's chief counsel, and under his stewardship the program 
culminated in the United States Supreme Court's historic decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education. 7 While Margold focused on the public 
schools, Houston on the full equalization of facilities at the graduate 
school level, and Marshall on the desegregation of law schools, gradu-
ate schools and finally public schools, the ultimate goal of all three was 
to have the enforced separation of black and white students in public 
institutions declared unconstitutional. Viewed in this light, the 
NAACP's legal strategy to outlaw segregated education followed a co-
hesive, unitary course from Margold to Marshall. 
Professor Tushnet has done a service, I believe, in illuminating the 
politics surrounding the Garland Fund grant to the NAACP. That 
grant could be said to mark the genesis of the NAACP's paid national 
legal staff. · Controversy raged between Roger Baldwin, subsequently 
the long-time director of the American Civil Liberties Union, and 
Walter White, Executive Director of the NAACP, over the use of the 
Garland Fund grant. Tushnet cites W.E.B. DuBois' disapproval of 
the NAACP's proposed use of the grant to attack segregated educa-
tion. He points out that DuBois at the time believed that discrimina-
tion in education, rather than segregation, should be fought. 8 The 
author proceeds to address the Margold proposal and Houston's and 
Marshall's subsequent activities. The general outline of all of these 
6. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Bluford v. Canada, 32 F. 
Supp. 707 (W.D. Mo. 1940). Charles Houston left the NAACP staff in 1940, and never had any 
official connection with it during my tenure, which began in 1945. 
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), ajfd. on rehearing, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II). 
8. However, I believe that Tushnet, at pages 8-10, provides a misleading impression of Du-
Bois' views. One would conclude from the quoted material and discussion that DuBois favored a 
legal strategy seeking equal educational facilities only, leaving Plessy v. Ferguson's separate-but-
equal doctrine undisturbed. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). My own understand-
ing is that his views were more complex. Despite the quotes from DuBois' editorial in the Janu-
ary 1934 issue of the Crisis (pp. 8-9), DuBois' primary point was that blacks needed "neither 
segregated schools nor mixed schools. What [blacks need] is Education." DuBois, Does the 
Negro Need Separate Schools, 4 J. NEGRO Eouc. 328, 335 (1935) reprinted in 2 THE SEVENTH 
SON, THE THOUGHTS AND WRITINGS OF W.E.B. DuBOIS 408 (J. Lester ed. 1971). DuBois' 
eventual break with the NAACP came about because he felt the organization's basic emphasis 
was solely on integration. His belief was that the goal should be equal education however it 
could be achieved - without segregation, if possible, but if not, with segregation as long as the 
black child was educated. 
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events is known; the details that Tushnet describes, however, are much 
less familiar and are of considerable interest. 
The interpretive prong of Professor Tushnet's thesis - less suc-
cessful than the narrative one - attempts to show that the NAACP's 
legal strategy for desegregation was ad hoc, pragmatic, and subject to 
shifts and modifications influenced by organizational needs. I am not 
persuaded by this thesis, principally for two reasons. The first is that 
Professor Tushnet couples the university and public school cases, 
which sought to undermine the constitutionality of segregation in edu-
cation, with litigation that sought to secure equal pay for black teach-
ers. He therefore treats these two independent litigation programs as 
if they were one. The second source of my dissatisfaction is Professor 
Tushnet's failure to account for or to understand the reasons that led 
the NAACP's national legal staff not simply to advocate "separate but 
equal" facilities, but to press relentlessly for a direct attack on Plessy v. 
Ferguson. 9 
Tushnet's emphasis on the teachers'-salary litigation and the initial 
failure of litigation in North Carolina and Tennessee to redress univer-
sity segregation does not make his intended point. 10 The teachers' -
salary litigation and the university and school cases were a breed 
apart. The litigation to equalize the pay of black teachers was not an 
attack on segregation in education. Nor was it an effort to integrate 
teaching staffs. It simply sought to upgrade the pay scale of black 
teachers to that of white teachers. The only justification I can discern 
for lumping the school segregation and teacher-pay litigation together 
is that the teachers' -salary cases advance the book's thesis that the 
NAACP's legal strategy was subject to mutation as demanded by or-
ganizational requisites. 
In the teachers' -salary litigation, the named teacher-plaintiff was 
exposed and vulnerable. No such vulnerability was present for the 
university-plaintiff. Admittedly, she or he might have faced mob at-
tack upon seeking to enter school after a victory in court. This was 
the case at the Universities of Georgia 11 and Alabama. 12 But a stu-
dent's economic base was not threatened. Moreover, the teacher-
plaintiff did not necessarily come to the NAACP through its local 
units. At the time, there were black teacher organizations in each 
state. Their members had a paramount interest in the issue of equal 
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
10. See pp. 52-55. Despite the decision in Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 
(1936), the separate-but-equal doctrine was still firmly entrenched. No court insisted on equal 
facilities as requisite to enforcement of the doctrine until 1938, when the Supreme Court decided 
Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337. Therefore, I am not certain that the result 
would have made a difference even absent the deficiencies the author points out. 
11. See, e.g., Holmes v. Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Ga. 1961). 
12. See, e.g., Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955), affg. per curiam, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. La. 
1955). 
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pay. Usually, such organizations found a teacher willing to take the 
risk of becoming a plaintiff. The organization would agree to insure 
the teacher a year's salary if fired. Then, the teachers' group would 
ask the NAACP to take on the litigation. After 1945, with the one 
exception cited below, none of these cases was handled by the national 
legal staff.13 
When I came to the NAACP after the war, the focus had already 
shifted to securing the admission of blacks to law schools and graduate 
schools in the South. Teachers'-salary litigation as an NAACP enter-
prise was then winding down. Litigation had been instituted in most 
states; the NAACP, at the request of the teachers, had sponsored suits 
in states where none had been filed. Constance Motley and I tried one 
such case in Jackson, Mississippi, for example, the only such case 
either of us ever handled, as I recall. It was, I am certain, the last such 
case sponsored by the national legal staff. During my tenure we were 
primarily engaged in attacking segregation in housing, 14 transporta-
tion, 15 and education.16 
The key point that must be grasped concerning the relationship 
between organizational needs and legal strategy is not, as Professor 
Tushnet would have it, that NAACP litigators and local branches 
conformed their approach to the short-term desires of black Southern 
communities in order to increase the Association's organizational base 
among that constituency. Rather, th~ organization's staff took the 
lead in setting an agenda at the local level. If organizational needs 
13. See, e.g., Bates v. Batte, 187 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1951) (handled by national stafi); Cook v. 
Davis, 178 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1950) (handled by A.T. Walden of Atlanta, Georgia, and Oliver 
W. Hill of Richmond, Virginia); Reynolds v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 148 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 
1945) (handled by Florida counsel); Carter v. School Bd., 87 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Va. 1949) 
(handled by Hill, Martin & Robinson of Richmond, Virginia); Butler v. Wilemon, 86 F. Supp. 
397 (N.D. Tex. 1949) (handled by Dallas counsel); Pitts v. Board of Trustees, 84 F. Supp. 975 
(E.D. Ark. 1949) (handled by Arkansas counsel); Freeman v. County School Bd., 82 F. Supp. 
167 (E.D. Va. 1948) (handled by Hill, Martin & Robinson); Whitmyer v. Lillian Parish School 
Bd., 75 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. La. 1948) (handled by A.P. Tureaud and Louis Berry of New Orle-
ans and Thurgood Marshall of New York City). 
14. See, e.g., Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (restrictive covenant); Birmingham v. 
Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1951); Detroit Hous. Commn. v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 
1955); Heywood v. Public Hous. Admin., 135 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Ga. 1955); Johnson v. Levitt & 
Sons, 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955); Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 
N.E.2d 541 (1949); Northwest Civic Assn. v. Sheldon, 217 Mich. 416, 27 N.W.2d 36 (1947) 
(restrictive covenant). 
15. See, e.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Westside v. Southern Bus Lines, 177 
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1949); Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 
1955), revd. on rehg., 239 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1956), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 901 (1956). 
16. See, e.g., Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), petition far writ of mandamus 
denied sub nom. Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948); see also, e.g., McKissick v. Carmichael, 
187 F.2d 949 (4th Cir. 1951); Gray v. Board of Trustees, 97 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Tenn. 1951), 
ajfd., 100 F. Supp. 113 (E.D. Tenn. 1951), vacated and dismissed as moot, 342 U.S. 517 (1952). 
Compare Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947), where the 
NAACP's amicus brief was the forerunner of its brief in Brown v. Board of Education arguing 
that segregation per se violated due process and equal protection guarantees. 
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dictated legal strategy, that was because the legal strategy was ab initio 
the product of institutional necessities. After all, the organizational 
purpose of the NAACP was to secure equal citizenship rights for 
blacks, and among those rights was the right to equal educational op-
portunity. That litigation thus fulfilled one of the organization's most 
basic functions. 
Thus, the education cases, at both the university and grade school 
levels were the products of local NAACP efforts to implement na-
tional policy. Local branches stimulated opposition to school segrega-
tion and encouraged their members to challenge segregation in 
schools, housing, and transportation in accord with national NAACP 
policy. Such local efforts encouraged members of the branches, or the 
friends or acquaintances of members, to come forward as plaintiffs to 
prosecute the litigation. It is true that economic pressure was placed 
on the parents of children involved in South Carolina and Virginia 
school desegregation cases in an attempt to derail the litigation. How-
ever, in those cases, so many plaintiffs were enlisted that opponents 
were never able to frighten off all of them in any case. 
The NAACP certainly sought followers, money, and influence, but 
the hope was that success in the courts would bring them to bear. 
That Professor Tushnet has inverted the true relationship between na-
tional strategy and local organizational needs is best illustrated by the 
decision in 1950 to pursue a "direct attack" on school segregation, the 
strategy that culminated in Brown v. Board of Education. I believe 
that the Association could have held back on its all-out attack on seg-
regation without adverse organizational effect. While the national 
staff was committed to an attack on segregation per se, there was no 
compelling demand from the local units that such an attack be 
launched. Local units would have been satisfied at the time if the or-
ganization had opted for litigation merely to upgrade the black 
schools. Indeed, black teachers and principals were very wary about 
an attack on segregation, and with good reason. Our success cost a 
number of them their jobs,17 even if they benefited in the long run. 
Tushnet gives considerable attention to Carter Wesley's18 dispute 
with Marshall over the merits of a direct challenge to segregation as 
opposed to an effort to obtain equal school facilities. The black com-
munity was divided on the issue. Some felt very strongly that a direct 
17. See, e.g., Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968); Wall v. Stanley 
County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th 
Cir. 1966); Chambers v. Hendersonville Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966); see also N. 
DORSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEUBORNE & S. LAW, 2 EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS JN THE UNITED STATES 754 (4th ed. 1979) (reporting that HEW data from 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas showed that the number of black 
teachers declined by 5% between 1968 and 1970, and the ratio of black to white teachers de· 
clined by 69% during the same period). 
18. Wesley was editor of an influential black newspaper published in Houston and was one of 
the most influential men in the Texas black community. See pp. 107-09. 
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attack on segregation would be irresponsible because of the possibility 
of failure, while others were convinced that such an attack was the 
only prudent course. I believe that the majority sentiment in the black 
community was a desire to secure for blacks all of the educational 
nurturing available to whites. If ending school segregation was the 
way to that objective, fine; if, on the other hand, securing equal facili-
ties was the way, that too was fine. 
Far from being preordained by organizational considerations, the 
direct-attack strategy actually cost the Association, for a time, the 
services of some of our best-trained lawyers in the South. These law-
yers refused to continue working with us when we determined that no 
more equal facilities cases would be brought under NAACP aus-
pices.19 Indeed, as late as the announcement by the Supreme Court 
that it would hear argument in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Rights20 
and Sweatt v. Painter, 21 opposition to the NAACP's strategy of an all-
out attack on segregation was so strong that Thurgood Marshall felt 
the need to hold a conference at Howard University in Washington, 
D.C., to afford advocates of the strategy an opportunity to make their 
case and counter the opposing sentiment. Interestingly enough, 
W.E.B. DuBois' presentation at the conference was among the most 
influential in gaining support for the all-out attack. (His presence 
lends support to my challenge of Tushnet's interpretation of DuBois' 
views. )22 While he did not address himself to the merits of the contro-
versy, DuBois spoke eloquently about the economic exploitation and 
degradation of blacks and advised the audience that blacks had to be-
come knowledgeable about the ways and means of such exploitation in 
order to free themselves from bondage. He certainly understood the 
purpose of the conference, and his participation in it indicated to the 
conferees and the public his support for a direct attack on segregation. 
It is true that in all but the last of its briefs filed in the United 
States Supreme Court in the cases grouped together as Brown v. Board 
of Education, the NAACP straddled the issue - arguing that segrega-
tion was, itself, invalid and arguing as well that the state had failed to 
provide equal facilities. Nonetheless, the NAACP's public posture 
from 1950 onward was that an all-out attack on segregation was being 
waged. The equal-facilities arguments were retained only out of the 
lawyers' sense of caution, not because of any need to appease local 
organizational sentiment. On the contrary, my perception is that the 
19. Lewis Hill and Martin Martin of the Hill, Martin, Robinson firm in Richmond refused to 
abide by the NAACP policy adopted by the Board in 1950, providing that the organization 
would thereafter handle cases attacking segregation per se. After about a year or two, however, 
those and other lawyers resumed their cooperation with the NAACP. 
20. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
21. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
22. See note 8 supra. 
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national office took a stand against any form of segregation and led its 
local constituency to accept that view. 
When the NAACP made its commitment in 1930 to an attack on 
segregation in education, Charles Houston stood alone as its legal 
staff. Later he was assisted and then succeeded by Thurgood Mar-
shall. Marshall began to build a paid legal staff during World War II. 
He hired Milton Konvitz23 and Edward Dudley24 as full-time assist-
ants in the early 1940s. Konvitz left in mid-1940 and I joined the staff. 
By 1950, the staff had grown to about ten lawyers.25 
Houston and Marshall were extraordinary men - brilliant law-
yers, charismatic, and politically astute. They had help from the 
Howard University Law Faculty, principally William Hastie and Leon 
Ransom, also extraordinary men. Indeed, while Hastie and Marshall 
are generally acknowledged as being among the best legal minds of 
their generation, until recently only insiders recognized the brilliance 
of Houston and Ransom. Despite such formidable talent on the na-
tional level, there was no cadre of reliable local talent to turn to in the 
South. Therefore, the litigation effort was, of necessity, severely cir-
cumscribed. Moreover, Hastie and Ransom had other full-time em-
ployment and could devote only part of their time to NAACP causes. 
This situation did not begin to change until early 1940, as a na-
tional staff began to form. However, finding competent local counsel 
remained a problem. Except for cases brought in Virginia (which were 
handled by the firm of Hill, Martin & Robinson) and Delaware (where 
Lewis Redding supervised the cases locally), local counsel required 
close supervision from New York until late in my tenure on the staff. 
In short, the NAACP's commitment to a direct attack on segregated 
education did not get off the ground until 1945 or 1946, when, as I 
have indicated, the equal-pay teacher cases were no longer part of the 
national staff's agenda. 
The book's theoretical agenda is grander than suggested by the 
foregoing discussion, however, for in his conclusion, Professor 
Tushnet offers some general speculations on the practice of public-in-
23. Konvitz, subsequent to leaving the NAACP, taught at the Cornell School for Industrial 
and Labor Relations and the Cornell Law School. 
24. Edward Dudley left the staff to serve as Ambassador to Liberia during President Tru· 
man's administration. Thereafter, he returned to the staff for a brief period, was appointed to 
New York City Family Court, became President of the Borough of Manhattan, and was subse· 
quently elected to the New York State Supreme Court. 
25. Among those on the staff were Constance Baker Motley, who became President of the 
Borough of Manhattan, and subsequently Chief Judge of the Southern District of New York 
until taking senior status in 1987; Franklin H. Williams, who subsequently was assistant to the 
first director of the Peace Corps, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, then to 
Ghana, and is now president of the Phelps Stokes Fund; Jack Greenberg, who became Director 
of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund after Marshall and is now teaching at Columbia Law 
School; and Marian Wyn Perry, who later married and became a housewife. Other lawyers were 
also hired, all after 1950. 
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terest law. Since I discerned no deeper unity in his conclusions than 
that of a series of unlinked observations, I will limit myself to address-
ing the particular ones with which I take issue. 
Professor Tushnet seems to believe that if the NAACP had low-
ered its sights and pressed for equal facilities, whites might have been 
more sympathetic and success more likely. But what is there in our 
experience to validate that supposition? While residential patterns of 
segregation and the neighborhood-school policy have produced more 
segregated schools today than existed before Brown, little effort at 
equalization seems to have been made. So vast is the economic cost of 
equalization that there is no public will to expend such money, partic-
ularly when the funds are viewed as benefiting chiefly blacks, Hispan-
ics and poor children. Thus far, efforts to equalize facilities or to 
provide equal education have been meager throughout the country. 
The assumption appears to have been that less rigorous educational 
training is needed in the schools that are predominantly black. The 
belief that an equal-facilities strategy would have produced greater re-
wards for black children in the upper South by 1970 is myth. I can 
understand the impulse to retreat to fantasy when one faces the stud-
ied indifference of the white majority to the educational neglect of 
black children and a callousness which justifies that neglect with the 
racist notion that black children are uneducable. Still, residential seg-
regation in the urban North produces segregated and unequal schools 
as relentlessly as did the dual-school system in the South. The Public 
Education Association conducted a study of New York City schools in 
1955 and found the predominantly black schools unequal to the 
predominantly white schools in the three R's, as measured by stan-
dardized achievement tests. A follow-up study in 1965 found no im-
provement over the ten-year interval. 26 
Perhaps an even firmer rejection of Tushnet's conjecture results 
from a reading of Hobson v. Hansen. 27 Judge Skelly Wright's opinion 
in that case is a thorough expose of the methodology utilized in urban 
school districts to maintain white school enclosures, to restrict high-
quality educational offerings to those schools, and deliberately to in-
sure low-quality educational offerings in predominantly black schools. 
In Hobson, a neighborhood school policy insured racial segregation 
26. The Public Education Association assisted by the New York University Research Center 
for Human Relations prepared two reports in 1955: The Status of the Public School Education of 
Negro and Puerto Rican Children in New York City and Quality of Education Offered to Majority 
and Minority (Negro, Puerto Rican) Children in New York City's Public Schools. The latter 
study, at pages 35-37, showed that based on the results of standardized achievement tests, 
schools which were predominantly black and Puerto Rican were behind predominantly white 
schools by a half year in reading and arithmetic at the third grade level, one and one-third years 
behind at the sixth grade level, and two years behind at the eighth grade level. 
27. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), cert. dismissed, 308 U.S. 801 (1968), ajfd. sub nom 
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en bane). There were many other decisions 
published in this case, but the one cited is for our purposes of primary interest. 
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in the system, but various options enabled white children to avoid at-
tending their neighborhood schools if they were predominantly black. 
Moreover, the students were educated on a track system which had 
the effect of resegregating the races within individual schools based on 
ability groupings. There were four tracks - a track for gifted stu-
dents, a college preparatory track, a general track for those who did 
not plan to go to college, and a basic track for slow learners and the 
academically retarded. Judge Wright found a socioeconomic correla-
tion between the percentage of children in a given track and the in-
come level of the neighborhood served. The higher the median 
income, the greater the percentage of children in the high tracks. The 
percentage of blacks enrolled in the "basic track" exceeded their pro-
portionate representation in the student body. Moreover, Judge 
Wright found that at every level of comparison - in terms of physical 
adequacy, quality of the faculty, textbooks, supplies, curricula and 
special programs - the predominantly black schools were 
shortchanged. 
At another point Tushnet notes that equalization would not have 
been compatible with the ideal of equality embodied in Brown, but 
claims that "there was no relatively fixed ideal of equality with which 
racial discrimination was incompatible" (p. 160). He describes as arbi-
trary the Supreme Court's rejection of out-of-state scholarships for 
blacks in compliance with the states' requirement to provide equality 
for blacks.28 Unless one is prepared to perpetuate an abstraction on 
the order of Plessy v. Ferguson, equality in a Constitutional sense can 
only have a meaning that effectuates equality in real life. 
28. See pp. 160.61, citing Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). The 
Gaines Court stated: 
Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be performed 
only where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. It is there that the equality 
oflegal right must be maintained. That obligation is imposed by the Constitution upon the 
States severally as governmental entities - each responsible for its own laws establishing the 
rights and duties of persons within its borders. It is an obligation the burden of which 
cannot be cast by one State upon another, and no State can be excused from performance by 
what another State may do or fail to do. That separate responsibility of each State within its 
own sphere is of the essence of statehood maintained under our dual system. It seems to be 
implicit in respondents' argument that if other States did not provide courses for legal edu-
cation, it would nevertheless be the constitutional duty of Missouri when it supplied such 
courses for white students to make equivalent provision for negroes [sic]. But the plain duty 
would exist because it rested upon the State independently of the action of other States. We 
find it impossible to conclude that what otherwise would be an unconstitutional discrimina-
tion, with respect to the legal right to the enjoyment of opportunities within the State, can be 
justified by requiring resort to opportunities elsewhere. That resort may mitigate the incon-
venience of the discrimination but cannot serve to validate it. 
305 U.S. at 350. The above is a reasoned argument, clearly setting out the basis for the Court's 
holding that out-of-state scholarships do not satisfy the states' obligation to provide equal treat-
ment for blacks. The dissent does not make a reasoned argument to the contrary. Justice Mc-
Reynolds merely makes a conclusory statement that the problem "obviously is a difficult and 
highly practical one. A fair effort to solve it has been made by offering adequate opportunity for 
study when sought in good faith. The State should not be unduly hampered through the theori-
zation inadequately restrained by experience." 305 U.S. at 354 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
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A state builds a university with tax funds to which blacks contrib-
ute, yet Tushnet implies that barring blacks from their home-state uni-
versity and giving them scholarships to secure their education 
elsewhere need not be in absolute conflict with equality. For the Court 
to hold that a state could not condition its own constitutional obliga-
tions on what another state might do - in this instance, erect no bar-
riers to admissions of blacks to institutions of higher learning within 
its borders - seems entirely principled. The text from Chief Justice 
Hughes' opinion in Gaines 29 provides powerful justification in support 
of the thesis that "out of state scholarships" were constitutionally in-
sufficient. "Arbitrariness" more aptly describes Tushnet's unusual no-
tion that out-of-state scholarships could fulfill the state's obligation to 
provide equal treatment for its black citizenry. 
He chides the Court for its emphasis in Sweatt and McLaurin on 
the intangibles rather than on the finite facilities in determining educa-
tional equality.30 But what makes a university great are undoubtedly 
the intangibles - its reputation, the success and power of its alumni, 
the prestige of its faculty, and the public perception of its institutional 
quality. To be sure, material endowments may, over time, upgrade an 
institution to the highest rank. In the process, however, the in-
tangibles are upgraded as well. Professor Tushnet, in suggesting that 
intangibles might be disregarded as part of the equation which defines 
educational equality, is again giving equality an abstract, sterile and 
enfeebled connotation. 
In the final analysis, what I find most troubling about the treatise is 
Tushnet's argument that such a sterile and abstract approach to equal 
educational opportunity by the Court in 1954 could have satisfied 
fourteenth amendment guarantees (pp. 160-61) admittedly designed, 
at a minimum, to bar state-ordered discrimination. The Court, on the 
other hand, rightfully sought to give the clause a twentieth-century 
dimension with pragmatic effect. 
Tushnet also speculates that the attack on segregation undermined 
some of the institutions within the black community (pp. 164-65), but 
he gives no examples of this. I do not know of any viable black com-
munity institution that Brown leveled. Perhaps the black teacher orga-
nizations constitute the exception. Some black public and private 
colleges are indeed under severe stress today, but that stress results 
29. See note 28 supra. 
30. P. 161. Tushnet states that "accepting the NAACP's sociological argument was an inno-
vation," and that the sociological evidence was used to challenge legislative policy as being incon-
sistent with "a higher norm of equality." P. 161. I do not understand what that means. He says 
this argument could have been resisted and the intangibles stressed in Sweatt and McLaurin 
could have been seen as the result of economies of scale in education. It is true that economies of 
scale could have led to a determination that the low level of demand at the university level was 
the basis for the gap in intangibles. But at the grade school level where compulsory schooling is 
enforced, that argument would not work. Indeed, if the basis is economies of scale, racially 
separate schooling would be doomed. The cost would outweigh the benefit. 
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from a lack of financial support. We do not know whether the stric-
tures which some of the black institutions now suffer would have oc-
curred in any event. The 1964 Civil Rights Act did much to enlarge a 
black middle class that had heretofore been virtually static. This 
greatly enlarged group would have sought to secure admission to col-
leges and universities with national prestige in the North and West 
even if Brown had not been decided. Moreover, affirmative action re-
quirements imposed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act probably did 
more to spur white universities to seek more black applicants than did 
the Brown decision. 
Tushnet seems to believe that some of the new NAACP staff mem-
bers, having lived in New York before joining the staff, "enthusiasti-
cally favored the direct attack" on segregation and may not have fully 
appreciated the difficulty the litigation might cause for blacks in the 
South (p. 111). There is no basis for that conjecture. The potentially 
dire implications for participants in the South Carolina and Virginia 
cases were carefully explained to them by national staff lawyers. 
Before these cases were filed, the challenge to segregation had intensi-
fied in all areas - at the university level, in interstate and intrastate 
commerce, and even in regard to recreational facilities. White resist-
ance was also intensifying. The cases were filed at a time when eco-
nomic pressure was being exerted on blacks to curb their new 
militancy. In that climate, it was necessary for national staff lawyers 
to meet with the parents of all putative plaintiffs before the complaint 
was filed in South Carolina or Virginia to point out the risks being 
taken in joining a lawsuit as threatening as one challenging segregation 
and to afford them the opportunity to give the matter careful, further 
consideration before making a final commitment to join in the litiga-
tion. That so few stepped back still astounds me. Undoubtedly, they 
felt that the only hope for their children lay in putting themselves at 
economic risk. 
I believe the treatise is largely accurate in its narrative of the events 
that constituted the organization's legal activity in the university and 
school cases, the origin of the program and its early developments. It 
is also a serious effort to provide a full and fair presentation of the 
surrounding events. However, Tushnet's interpretation gives a narrow 
and constricted reading of the import and meaning to blacks and to 
the country of the long struggle he discusses. Blacks clearly would 
have been in no worse position today, in terms of educational benefits 
in the public school arena, if we had concentrated on an equal facilities 
goal. This is so because Brown, seen solely as a school case, must be 
considered a failure. What makes Brown historic, however, is its fall-
out effect. It transformed and radicalized race relations in this coun-
try, removing blacks from the status of supplicants to full citizenship 
under law, with entitlement by law to all the rights and privileges of all 
other citizens. Equal citizenship is not yet a reality, but blacks can 
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now contend that the reality is contrary to the law.31 This is a power-
ful argument - a potent force that an equal facilities victory could not 
have produced. 
What for me is the most basic defect in Professor Tushnet's thesis 
is his fundamental misunderstanding of the NAACP strategy. True, 
the strategy was to attack segregation in education, but the real agenda 
was the removal of the basic barrier to full and equal citizenship rights 
for blacks in this country. With segregation eliminated, blacks, it was 
thought, would have an unrestricted opportunity to function in 
America on equal terms with whites. We now know, of course, that 
the NAACP lawyers erred. The lawyers did not understand then how 
effective white power could be in preventing full implementation of the 
law; nor did they realize at the time that the basic barrier to full equal-
ity for blacks was not racial segregation, a symptom, but white 
supremacy, the disease. Although any thoughtful person might 
readily see that fact now, it took the removal of constitutional support 
for racial segregation to make clear that black subordination is a na-
tional, not a regional, problem. At any rate, NAACP aims, miscon-
ceived though they may have been, were far grander than Professor 
Tushnet's discussion implies. 
31. The same point was made in this publication about 20 years ago. See Carter, The Wa"en 
Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REv. 237 (1968). 
